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CORRESPONDENCE 
A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism 
David Schuman* 
James A. Gardner begins The Failed Discourse of State Constitu-
tionalism 1 with a story describing "the experience of a great many 
lawyers in this country."2 The protagonist is an attorney whose client 
has an unlawful discrimination claim that for some reason cannot suc-
ceed under the U.S. Supreme Court's current equal protection juris-
prudence. The attorney decides to present an argument based on her 
state constitution's equality guarantee, only to discover that the uni-
verse of material from which a plausible argument, not to mention a 
rich discourse, might emerge - existing case law and scholarship, 
"useful tidbits"3 of constitutional history and philosophy from the 
state's jurists - is either thin, incoherent, derivative, or nonexistent.4 
The moral of Professor Gardner's story is that state constitutional dis-
course is impoverished. 
l propose a different story. The time is the present. The place is 
Oregon. My protagonist, like Gardner's, has a client claiming unlaw-
ful discrimination. Heeding both the judicial5 and extrajudicial6 ad-
vice of the state's supreme court justices, she turns to the state 
constitution before even contemplating a challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause. What she finds is a well-developed, carefully rea-
soned line of cases that does not significantly refer to federal law. 7 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon. B.A. 1966, Stanford; Ph.D. 1974, Uni-
versity of Chicago; J.D. 1984, University of Oregon. - Ed. 
1. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 
(1992). 
2. Id. at 764. 
3. Id. at 765. 
4. Id. at 763-66. 
5. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981). 
6. See Wallace P. Carson, Jr., ''Last Things Last'~· A Methodological Approach to Legal Ar· 
gument in State Courts, 17 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 641 (1983); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: 
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980). 
7. See Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773 (Or. 1990); Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435 (Or. 
1990); Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989); Hunter v. State, 761 P.2d 502 (Or. 
1988); City of Salem v. Bruner, 702 P.2d 70 (Or. 1985); State v. Freeland, 667 P.2d 509 (Or. 
1983); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982); Norwest v. Presbyte· 
rian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982); State v. Edmonson, 630 P.2d 822 (Or. 
1981); State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810 (Or. 1981); Monroe v. Withycombe, 165 P. 227 (Or. 1917); 
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These cases develop an entirely different method of analysis - one 
that does not include, for example, levels of scrutiny, fundamental 
rights, or suspect classes. 8 Further, the Oregon analysis is based on 
the particular language of the Oregon Constitution9 as well as its his-
torical, political, and cultural context.10 It is sensitive to the general 
philosophy of Oregon constitutional jurisprudence as developed by the 
state's appellate courts over recent decades.11 To refine her under-
standing of the case law, the Oregon attorney can also refer to a vari-
ety of scholarly articles devoted to the state equality guarantee.12 In 
short, her research will quickly lead her to a richly textured, locally 
rooted state constitutional discourse, the lexicon of which she can then 
employ in fashioning her own contribution. 
The Oregon practitioner could also find original, thorough, and 
coherent analyses of other frequently litigated provisions of the Ore-
gon Constitution - analyses based in most cases on distinctly local 
history, text, culture, and traditions. For example, in Oregon, where 
Altschul v. State, 144 P. 124 (Or. 1914); White v. Holman, 74 P. 933 (Or. 1904); In re Oberg, 28 
P. 130 (Or. 1891). 
8. I have described this analysis as follows: 
The first step ... is to classify the challenged discrimination as implicating either a true class 
[i.e., a pre-existing, socially-recognized self-conscious group], a "pseudo-class" [i.e., a group 
created or called into existence by the challenged state action itself, with no prior existence 
as a group], or an individual. Each of these types of discrimination is governed by different 
principles and rules. The government may not discriminate against a true class if the class is 
based on some immutable social or personal characteristic, and the classification derives 
from an invidious prejudice or stereotype. "Pseudo-class" discrimination is impermissible 
when the law does not leave entry into that class open on the same terms to all citizens. 
Distribution of privileges or immunities to individuals must proceed according to systematic 
criteria consistently applied; ad hoc, haphazard treatment, or treatment based on other im-
permissible or unauthorized criteria will be unlawful. 
David Schuman, The Right to ''Equal Privileges and Immunities'~· A State's Version of "Equal 
Protection," 13 VT. L. REV. 221, 244-45 (1988) (citations omitted). 
9. Article I,§ 20 of the Oregon Constitution reads: "No law shall be passed granting to any 
citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not 
equally belong to all citizens." The Supreme Court of Oregon has noted that this provision 
guarantees equality not only to all classes of citizens, but to all citizens as individuals. This latter 
guarantee ensures that the state cannot distribute benefits or burdens unsystematically. State v. 
Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814 (Or. 1981). 
10. See Clark, 630 P.2d at 814. The court noted that the Oregon Constitution's equality 
provision predates the abolition of slavery, originating at a time when equality jurisprudence 
focused not on claims against oppression but against special privilege. 630 P.2d at 814. In fact, 
the population that ratified this provision also ratified a provision barring the immigration of 
blacks into the state. See OR. CoNST. art. I, § 35 (repealed 1926). 
11. For example, in several types of constitutional cases, the court has indicated that it will 
not engage in judicial balancing. See, e.g., Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 
695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985) (religion); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983) (criminal proce-
dure); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982) (free expression). 
12. See Simone Liebman, Striking a Parental Notification Statute Under Oregon Constitu-
tional Law, 10 OR. L. REv. 651 (1991); Hans A. Linde, Without ''Due Process'~· Unconstitutional 
Law in Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev. 125, 140-43 (1970); Schuman, supra note 8; Jon P. Stride, Com-
ment, Oregon's System of School Finance: A Challenge to Constitutional Principles and Tradition. 
69 OR. L. REV. 295 (1990). 
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the supreme court eschews judicial balancing13 and the constitutional 
free speech guarantee prohibits government restraint of expression "on 
any subject whatever,"14 the only permissible speech limitations are 
those that were well established when the constitutional guarantee was 
adopted and that the guarantee was manifestly not designed to elimi-
nate - such as liability for perjury or fraud. 15 Thus, noting that "Or-
egon's pioneers brought with them a diversity of highly moral as well 
as irreverent views," and that "most members of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1857 were rugged and robust individuals dedicated to 
founding a free society unfettered by the governmental imposition of 
some people's views of morality on the free expression of others," the 
Oregon Supreme Court has held that the Oregon Constitution protects 
even pornographic or obscene expression.16 
Contrary to Gardner's thesis, the Oregon experience demonstrates 
what every Oregon lawyer knows: state constitutional law does not 
have to be infrequent, grudging, obscurely reasoned, unoriginal, or si-
lent with respect to local history and culture. A state - even an out-
of-the-way and relatively new one like Oregon - can develop a strik-
ingly independent universe of constitutional references and a constitu-
tional culture completely distinct from the one used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
This is not to say that many states have done so. Gardner is surely 
correct in his conclusion that state constitutional discourse in most 
jurisdictions, including the ones he surveys, is impoverished.17 But as 
the Oregon experience demonstrates, once it becomes clear that a 
state's highest court is serious about the primacy and independence of 
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
14. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
15. See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 576. 
16. See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987). Oregon search·and-seizure jurisprudence 
is equally independent. For example, the definition of search has nothing to do with anybody's 
"reasonable expectation of privacy," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring), but with whether or not the official conduct in question, if indulged in by govern-
ment agents at will, would reduce the people's freedom from unwanted scrutiny. State v. Camp-
bell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Or. 1988). Nor may state officials conduct an "administrative search" 
whenever the government's need outweighs the individual's; rather, the search must be author-
ized by either judicial warrant or legislation defining the purpose and scope of the intrusion. See 
State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054 (Or. 1988); cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (upholding 
administrative search under U.S. Constitution). 
17. I suggest that this has nothing to do with inherent qualities of state constitutionalism. 
Rather, the reason is that state supreme court judges must introduce, demand, and subsequently 
nurture constitutional discourse. This is not an easy task. Presented with the option of either 
plugging particular facts into the U.S. Supreme Court's latest balancing test or multipronged 
analysis, or fashioning a coherent and original interpretation of the state charter from its text, 
history, and preincorporation case law, most judges facing overcrowded appellate dockets (not to 
mention lawyers facing cost-conscious clients) opt for the former. 
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the state constitution, lawyers and lower courts will begin to partici-
pate vigorously in the development of a rich and useful discourse. Be-
cause this experience proves that a carefully, patiently, and 
systematically cultivated state constitutionalism can produce such dis-
course, the inference to draw from the failure in o~her jurisdictions is 
not, as Gardner argues, that they should practice less state constitu-
tionalism, but that they should practice it more and better.18 
Gardner's argument, in any event, is that more state constitutional 
law is not only undesirable, but impossible. Acknowledging that my 
proposal for a state constitutionalism based on local culture is a "pow-
erful" narrative that "hold[s] out the greatest hope for ... independent 
state constitutional discourse,"19 Gardner nevertheless argues that this 
hope "make[s] no sense" because (1) state constitutions do not in fact 
describe distinctive and coherent ways of life, (2) state constitutional-
ism is incompatible with national constitutionalism, and (3) as a peo-
ple we have chosen to resolve this incompatibility in favor of the 
nation.20 The existence of a distinctive and thriving state constitu-
tional law in at least one jurisdiction refutes these arguments. They 
also fail on their own terms. 
At the core of Gardner's assertion that state constitutions do not 
reflect significant local variations in culture is his observation that 
many of the distinctive provisions in state constitutions are either triv-
ial, 21 "the result of pluralistic logrolling,"22 or both. Thus, he argues, 
they are incapable of revealing anything meaningful about the citi-
zenry's character or addressing that character in appropriately distinc-
tive language. But courts in most instances should have no difficulty 
18. Perhaps I am more reluctant than Gardner to abandon "impoverished" state constitu-
tionalism in favor of its "successful,'' "rich," and "vigorous" federal analogue because I find 
recent federal constitutionalism to be impoverished- not because it is increasingly conservative, 
but because it is increasingly petulant, shrill, formulaic, and intellectually incoherent. See, e.g., 
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling majority opinion 
"bulldozer,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2679; "embarrassment," 112 S. Ct. at 2681; "psychology practiced by 
amateurs,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2681; "beyond the absurd,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2682; "distortion[] of the 
record,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2683; "precious,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2683; "bedeviled (so to speak),'' 112 S. Ct. 
at 2685;.and "a jurisprudential disaster,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2685); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
194 (1986) (characterizing issue as whether Constitution contains fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy; concluding respondent's claim that Constitution protects right to choose 
intimate companions is "facetious"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (calling objec-
tion, on Establishment Clause grounds, to city-sponsored celebration of birth of Christ a "stilted 
overreaction"); San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to sub-
ject unequal school funding scheme to heightened scrutiny because case presents no "suspect 
class" or "fundamental right"). 
19. Gardner, supra note 1, at 817 (citing David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional 
Law Cases: A Report from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CoNsr. L. 275, 285 (1989)). 
20. Id. at 817-18. 
21. Id. at 819-20. 
22. Id. at 821. 
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distinguishing between fundamental constitutive provisions and other, 
statute-like provisions that happen to be located in a document for-
mally styled a "constitution," usually as the result of some single-issue 
plebiscite. Fundamental constitutive provisions are directed to the 
general distribution of state powers, or they embody substantive values 
that citizens would identify as basic and shared.23 
Once the nonconstitutive portions of state constitutions, the 
merely political as opposed to the foundational, are filtered out, the 
remaining document may indeed contain significant peculiarities of 
text revealing local character. But even if the remaining words of the 
document are not particularly distinctive, their accent marks, their 
connotations, can be. Members of a state's legal community can in-
form the interpretation of the state constitution with local values and 
traditions. They can give distinctive meaning to the undistinctive text 
by interpreting it from their positions as members of a particular legal 
culture, lawyers in a particular place and time. Despite Gardner's ar-
guments about the dangers of incompatibility and the nonexistence of 
distinctive state identities, that endeavor is a practicable and worthy 
one. 
Gardner's "incompatibility" argument presents the following syl-
logism: America is a national community with a shared culture of 
universal norms enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. State constitu-
tionalism presumes state communities of shared norms that are "dif-
ferent" or "incompatible" with the national one. Thus, since "only 
one constitution at a time can ever truly and safely reflect the essential 
character and fundamental values of a people,"24 giving emphasis to 
state constitutions will lead to dangerous Balkanization. 
The first problem with this reasoning is its major premise, which 
uses the inherently oxymoronic phrase national community. But even 
conceding that such a thing could exist, it does not follow that it must 
displace smaller, included communities. As observers of America 
since de Tocqueville have noted, we are a nation of overlapping and 
layered loyalties encompassing a multitude of communities,25 many of 
which (for example, church and state) are far from incompatible. 
23. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 31 J. LEGAL Eouc. 167 (1987). In 
describing a constitution, Pitkin notes the two senses in which the word is used in our language: 
first, as "composition or fundamental make-up, .•. characteristic frame or nature," or what a 
stranger would learn of us from watching our conduct; and second, as "founding, framing, shap-
ing something anew." Id. at 167-68; see also Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering 
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (distinguishing "ordinary" from "extraordinary" 
lawmaking). 
24. Gardner, supra note 1, at 827-28. 
25. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (Phillips Bradley ed. & 
Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1862); 2 id. at 106-10. 
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Gardner's reference to "different or incompatible values"26 glosses 
over a crucial distinction. Federal constitutional values do not com-
pete with "different" state ones in the sense that they present citizens 
with "incompatible" choices. Under the Guaranty Clause27 and the 
Supremacy Clause, 28 citizens are never free to choose substantive state 
values that conflict with federal ones; they can only choose state values 
that add to or embellish them. It makes no sense to argue that a value 
revealed by a more expansive right conflicts with the value revealed by 
a lesser one. This fact stems from the nature of constitutional values: 
they define what citizens have, not what they lack. The value embed-
ded in the First Amendment has to do with how much freedom of 
expression Americans have, not how much authority to stifle it the 
government has. The Fourth Amendment declares that Americans 
value freedom from unreasonable searches; it does not declare that 
Americans value governmental authority to conduct all other 
searches. If the citizens of Oregon choose to protect pornographic ex-
pression29 instead of allowing it to be criminalized, or to require war-
rants or legislative authorization even for so-called "administrative" 
searches,30 they are not in conflict with differing federal value choices; 
the U.S. Supreme Court has simply said that Americans, through their 
Constitution, value at a minimum the freedom to engage in certain 
forms of expression and to be free from certain forms of government 
scrutiny. States remain free, in other words, to add to the national 
values given voice in the U.S. Constitution, which constitute a core, an 
irreducible minimum. An Oregonian shares fundamental constitutive 
values with all Americans and also a larger set with all other 
Oregonians. 
The problem, then, is not incompatibility but choice. Noting the 
"vigor of federal constitutional discourse,"31 Gardner concludes that 
"[t]he tension between state and national constitutionalism has been 
largely resolved in the modem day United States by the collapse of 
meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus 
that fundamental values in this country will be debated and resolved 
on a national level."32 The social consensus in favor of national con-
stitutionalism, however, did not result from some inherent national 
26. Gardner, supra note 1, at 824. 
27. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government ..•• "). 
28. U.S. CoNST. art. VI. 
29. See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987). 
30. See State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054 (Or. 1988). 
31. Gardner, supra note 1, at 828. 
32. Id. 
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superiority, constitutional or otherwise. Nor, as Gardner correctly ob-
serves, did it come about because the incorporation doctrine "required 
state courts to look to federal law."33 Rather, it resulted from the 
unwillingness of many state courts, particularly in the South, to use 
their own constitutions to protect their citizens from state overreach-
ing. The incorporation doctrine arose to allow these citizens to bring 
their claims in federal court, under the federal Constitution. Once the 
Warren Court had developed expansive interpretations of citizens' fed-
eral constitutional rights, state courts had no incentive to vindicate 
rights under the state constitution - even if litigants had been feckless 
enough to claim them. During this period, raising state constitutional 
issues became futile. Thus, the "social consensus" in favor of the fed-
eral Constitution arose to fulfill a need that no longer exists; today, the 
states' constitutions frequently offer more protection than their federal 
counterpart. Increasing reliance on state constitutions is simply a re-
turn to normalcy. 
Further, the "collapse of meaningful state identity" is as much a 
result of the hegemony of national constitutionalism as its cause. The 
relationship between identity and constitution is reciprocal and com-
plex: identity creates constitution, and constitution creates identity. 
The Warren Court is at least partly responsible for shaping a genera-
tion of lawyers, scholars, politicians, and ordinary citizens who believe 
that the constitution means the U.S. Constitution and have therefore 
lost the habit of regarding a state as a political body that can have its 
own constitutional identity. As the Oregon example demonstrates, 
that habit of mind can be recaptured. For those of us who believe that 
the nation is too large a polity ever to achieve meaningful community, 
the recent weakening of distinctive state identities argues for a vital 
state constitutionalism as a restorative tonic. 
Professor Gardner accurately depicts the depressed condition of 
state constitutional discourse in many jurisdictions. From that per-
fectly reasonable premise, he moves to an argument that state courts 
should abandon their attempts to improve it because that endeavor is 
inherently impossible and, in any event, undesirably schismatic. This 
argument ultimately fails, because he provides no convincing evidence 
that the development of sophisticated and vigorous state constitutional 
law is either impossible or unwise. By contrast, Oregon, as just one 
example, has shown that a state can develop a sophisticated independ-
ent constitutional culture without any noticeable threat to national 
values. 
33. Id. at 806. 
